
Los Angeles City Council: Studying Reform Proposals


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Devon Xiong



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Executive Summary

- Los Angeles has convened a Charter Reform Commission, which could alter how it elects its City Council
- Many civic groups + nonprofits advocate reforms to improve accountability & representation
- We provide analysis of efficacy of reform proposals









Los Angeles in context

- Country's second largest city, ~3.9 million residents
- LA is governed by a 15-member City Council
 - Each Councilor represents 250K+ residents
 - More residents per Councilor than virtually all peer cities (NYC, Chicago, Houston, Phoenix, Philadelphia, etc.)
- Among the nation's most diverse cities: 47% Hispanic, 29% non-Hispanic White, 12% Asian, and 8% Black by population



LA City Council Scandal

- **2021:** Council redraws Council district boundaries in controversial process
- Oct 9, 2022: Audio tape leaks of conversation between 3 City Council members & a labor leader
 - Tape contains extensive racist comments
 - Also details plans to gerrymander City Council map
- Jan 3, 2023: Council forms Ad Hoc Committee on Govt. Reform
- Nov 5, 2024: Voters pass Measure DD, creating independent redistricting commission



Proposed City Council Reforms

- Establish an independent redistricting commission
- Revise system in which a Councilor can be elected by receiving 50%+ in the primary (8 of 15 Councilors elected in this way)
- Increase the # of single-member districts
- Add multi-member or at-large districts, with representatives selected via ranked choice voting


Being considered by **Charter Reform Commission**:

- Began work July 2025
- Will present options to City Council in early 2026
- Possible 2026 ballot amendments



(2028 ballot amendments possibly a more reasonable timeline)

Research Overview




Initial Findings:

- 1. White voters **dramatically overrepresented** (and Latinos underrepresented) in electorates selecting LA's leaders
- 2. All racial groups favor Democrats, with limited evidence of **racially polarized voting** in Dem vs. Dem elections.
- **3. Geographic distribution** is most **favorable** for Black representation and least favorable for Asian + Hispanic voters

Outline

- Background and Context
- Race Prediction
- Ecological Inference
- Sampling Algorithms/Ensembles
- Preliminary Reform Recommendations
- Future Work



Race Prediction

Seek to **probabilistically impute** voters' racial self-identification.

Have access to **LA Voter File**. For all 2.1MM registered voters:

- First, middle, & last names
- Voters' addresses

Approach: Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG)

ID	First Name	Middle Name	Last Name	Census Block	Age	Party	Voted in Primary?	
00001	Kevin	James	Sweet	4263	18	Ind	1	
00002	John	David	Smith	2411	37	Dem	0	
00003	Helen	Ann	Chen	1875	33	Dem	1	

Race Prediction: BISG

Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG)

(Khanna & Imai, 2016)

Assume geo <u>l</u> surname | race. Use Bayes' rule to estimate:

```
P(race | surname, geo) ∝ P(race | surname) × P(geo | race)
```


- Probabilities estimated using Census data.
- Widely used in social science to study disparate racial policy impacts (Edwards et al., 2019; Hepburn et al., 2020; Fraga, 2018)

Improved BISG (Imai, Olivella, & Rosenman, 2022)

- Incorporates first and middle names
- Enhances probabilities via data from 6 Southern states (40MM+ voters)

LA Electorate


- Using our race probabilities, estimate 2022 composition:
 - Residents
 - Registered voters
 - General voters
 - Primary voters
- Latinos are a progressively smaller share; non-Hispanic Whites a larger share



La Electorate: City Council Districts

As a consequence:

- 7 majority Hispanic CDs →
 4 w/ majority Hispanic electorates
- 3 majority White CDs →
 5 w/ maj. White general
 6 w/ maj. White primary



Ecological Inference: Goals

- Seek to estimate **individual voters**' probabilities of supporting political candidates and causes
- Focus on the 2022 elections
 - Marquee race is LA Mayor, a competitive D vs. D race between progressive Karen Bass (55%) and moderate Rick Caruso (45%)
 - Also model statewide elections in LA:
 - CA Sen: Alex Padilla (D, 77%) vs. Mark Meuser (R, 23%)
 - CA Gov: Gavin Newsom (D, 75%) vs. Brian Dahle (R, 25%)
 - **Prop 1** (Abortion Rights): Yes (79%) vs. No (21%)



Ecological Inference: Scoring

- Two-stage scoring process
 - 1. Base scores: Fit model to Berkeley IGS poll.
 - Predict vote choice using age, gender, race, & partisanship.
 - Apply to all LA voters as "base scores."



- 2. Ecological correction: Train "ecological model" on top of scores:
 - Base scores b_{ij} (for voter i in precinct j) don't add to precinct j vote tally T_j
 - Model support probability for each voter as

$$p_{ij} = 1/(1 + \exp(-\beta^T X_{ij} + \log it(b_{ij}))$$

where X_{ii} is rich set of voter file covariates

• Train model via maximum likelihood under approximation:

$$T_j \sim N(\sum p_{ij}, \sum p_{ij}(1-pij))$$


- Approach bears some similarity to MRP (Gelman & Little, 1997)
- Plausibly reduces ecological bias by using base score as pilot estimate


Ecological Inference: Results

- All ethnic groups strongly prefer Dem candidates & propositions
- In Dem vs. Dem mayor's race, little evidence of racial polarization. Only Black voters strongly preferred one candidate (Bass).


Ethnic Group	Bass	Newsom	Padilla	Prop 1
White	53%	72%	75%	83%
Black	80%	90%	90%	87%
Hispanic	52%	76%	80%	72%
Asian	52%	73%	72%	79%
Other	56%	69%	72%	83%

- How do voter preferences interact with potential City Council Districts?
 - Voters not distributed evenly throughout LA
 - How districts are drawn can affect who's elected







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
(Progressive D vs. Moderate D)





(Democrat vs. Republican)





- How do voter preferences interact with potential City Council Districts?
 - Voters not distributed evenly throughout LA
 - How districts are drawn can affect who's elected
- Randomly sample 200,000 possible districting plans using the Recombination Markov Chain (DeFord, Duchin, & Solomon, 2021)
 - Repeatedly merge two districts & split in a new way
 - Enforces only compactness and population balance
 - Does not account for other goals a line-drawer may have
 - No mixing time know; mixing heuristics good
 - Wasserstein distance between two random samples quickly gets very small for statistics of interest














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 - Enforces only compactness and population balance
 - Does not account for other goals a line-drawer may have
 - No mixing time know; mixing heuristics good
 - Wasserstein distance between two random samples quickly gets very small for statistics of interest
- Evaluate each districting plan on statistics of interest
 - E.g. number of Hispanic-majority districts; number of voters whose preferences differ from those of their district; ...



Ensemble Results: 15 Districts

Finding 1: Enacted plan not an outlier






15 Districts

Ensemble Results: More Districts

Finding 1: Enacted plan not an outlier


Finding 2: More districts, same system = little representational change




Ensemble Results: More Districts

Finding 1: Enacted plan not an outlier

Finding 2: More districts, same system = little representational change






Ensemble Results: More Districts


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
New Metric: 'Mismatches'

- Measure geographic efficiency as % of each ethnicity voting for losing mayor candidate within each district
 - Bass/Caruso race best reflects prog vs. mod competition in LA politics
 - Bass won 10 CDs; Caruso won 5.
- Core idea: Are most members of each ethnic group in Council Districts that share their political preferences?
- 45% of Hispanic and 43% of Asian voters chose district loser, vs. 40% of White and 27% of Black voters




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
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New Metric: 'Mismatches'

- Measure geographic efficiency as % of each ethnicity voting for losing mayor candidate within each district
- **Core idea:** Are most members of each ethnic group in Council Districts that share their political preferences?
- Little change when increasing number of districts:






Aside: MAUP via Intersections

A new way to assign census block populations to precincts.

From voter file, can determine the number of voters in each *intersection* of a census block and a voting precinct.

Prorate population accordingly.




Solution: Assign 40% of Census Block 1's population to Precinct A, and 60% of Census Block 1's population to Precinct B


Problem: People move, so may be listed in a precinct and census block that don't overlap!

Future work: Remove impossible intersections

Reform Recommendations

- 1. Strong case for **choosing all Councilors in the general election**, rather than the primary.
 - November electorates modestly more representative than primaries
 - Primary winners routinely selected by 3-6% of district population







District 9

Reform Recommendations

- 1. Strong case for **choosing all Councilors in the general election**, rather than the primary.
 - November electorates modestly more representative than primaries
 - Primary winners routinely selected by 3-6% of district population
- **2. Council Expansion** unlikely *on its own* to change the delegation of power in the city (though there may be other arguments for it)
 - Differential participation and unfavorable geographic distributions impact
 Hispanic & Asian representation.
 - Expansion could potentially be paired with other reforms, to:
 - Boost registration & participation
 - Encourage cross-ethnic coalition building (e.g. via proportional RCV)

Next Steps

- Improved Ecological Inference (using CVAP)
- Changes to election outcome in general vs. primary?
- Additional analysis of single-member districts (goal-driven redistricting? election thresholds? coalitions? unique LA features?)
- Ranked Choice Voting
 - Modeling preferences via the VoteKit package (parameters from statistical analysis)
 - Single-member and multi-member districts
 - Comparative turnout investigation in cities with RCV (NYC, SF)
- Ongoing conversations with advocacy groups
- Providing feedback directly to the Charter Reform Commission

Thanks to the Haynes Foundation!

