Conventional Strategy
John J. Pitney, Jr.
Political consultant Joe Napolitan once called strategy the key to winning elections. “The right strategy can survive a mediocre campaign,” he said, “but even a brilliant campaign is likely to fail if the strategy is wrong.”
Originating in the world of war, the term “strategy” refers to a process of linking ends and means. In a new book from the University of Oklahoma Press, The Art of Political Warfare, I explain how such military concepts can help us understand contemporary politics. The GOP convention is a good case study, as it supplies a glimpse into Governor Bush’s strategy.
What’s the goal? That’s the first question for any strategist, and it may sound simple, since the obvious answer is “victory.” But defining victory can be complicated. In the Gulf War, President Bush defined victory as ousting Saddam Hussein from Kuwait – not overthrowing his regime in Iraq. This goal shaped the American course of action, which meant stopping the ground war before allied troops could reach Baghdad.
Victory can be just as tricky in politics, since one can win an election at the cost of governing successfully. At the 1988 convention, President Bush uttered his now-famous phrase, “Read my lips: no new taxes.” When he decided not to keep his promise, those six words did much to hobble his domestic presidency and deprive him of a second term.
In 1994, after sixteen years of harsh attacks against the Democrats, Newt Gingrich led the House GOP to majority status. In the process, he fueled partisan animosity and made himself the object of rabid hatred. This ill will eventually brought House business to a crawl and made it impossible for Gingrich to stay in office. Leon Panetta, President Clinton’s former chief of staff, once likened Gingrich to Napoleon Bonaparte in Russia. “Bonaparte, you know, moved in quickly, but then bogged down, because he didn't look ahead at what he was going to face in terms of the winter and the troops that were there. And I think he ran into the same problems on Capitol Hill.”
Gov. Bush has learned strategic lessons from these stories. He has forsworn a “read my lips” tax promise while leaving himself wide maneuvering room on the specifics of other issues. And throughout the convention, most of the speakers played the role of Un-Gingrich, touting the virtues of bipartisanship and scarcely mentioning the Democratic leaders by name.
Bush’s strategic goal is to win the White House in a way that avoids sticky commitments and hard feelings.
That sounds like a nice way to position oneself to govern, but GOP lawmakers worry that Bush is forgetting something: Congress. The convention focused on winning the presidency, with little prime-time attention to the tough fight for control of the House. During his acceptance speech, Bush never mentioned that fight. Instead, he said: “I don't have a lot of things that come with Washington. I don't have enemies to fight. I have no stake in the bitter arguments of the last few years.”
Granted, the GOP’s top congressional leaders are as visually appealing as the frog-tongued mutant in X-Men, but is it smart to overlook the battle of Capitol Hill?
In trying to pass a legislative agenda, Bush would obviously benefit from an overwhelming GOP majority in the House. He will almost certainly not get it. The current GOP margin of control is narrow, and relatively few seats are in play. (Brian Bilbray’s San Diego seat is one). So while either party could take the majority, the winning side will have only a slight edge. Bush thus has to ask himself whether he wants a narrow GOP majority or a narrow Democratic majority.
The answer isn’t obvious. Consider the first option: since a handful of Republicans usually defect on any given roll call, a Democratic minority could block nearly everything while shifting the blame to the GOP majority. To a large extent, that’s what House Democrats been doing for the past few years, but the duty to support a Democratic president has often curbed their obstructionism. Under a Republican president, they could subject the administration’s program to a legislative “wilding,” unbound by partisan loyalty or institutional accountability.
Alternatively, suppose Democrats take the majority, along with the responsibility that comes with it. At very least, the majority party has to pass appropriation bills and carry out routine legislative business. In order to do well in the next election, its members also need to tell the voters that they got some significant measures onto the law books. That’s exactly the situation the House GOP faced in 1996. After the unpopular government shutdowns, Republicans did an about-face and started cooperating with the White House on welfare reform and other initiatives.
House Democrats vividly remember this history. In the majority, they might grumble about a Bush agenda, but they would eventually pass some of it. So given a choice between a paralyzed GOP majority and an occasionally cooperative Democratic majority, Bush might prefer the latter. In this strategic context, then, it makes sense that Bush gave congressional Republicans so little time in Philadelphia.
Strategy is about means as well as ends. Given his goal of winning a high-road, personal victory, has Bush chosen the right means?
Some critics have questioned the choice of Dick Cheney as the vice presidential candidate, noting that while he would be a splendidly competent vice president, he adds little to the ticket for the fall campaign. The criticism overlooks the possibility that competence itself might appeal to the voters. Just as important, Cheney’s rousing acceptance speech showed him to be a more compelling campaigner than anyone suspected.
Though Bush and Cheney both took shots at the Clinton-Gore administration,
the general tone of the convention suggested that the Bush campaign will
be short on hard edges. The high command apparently assumes that
because voters say they dislike negativism, a positive GOP approach will
overcome Democratic criticisms. As Bush said on Thursday: “Their
war room is up and running, but we are ready. Their attacks will be relentless,
but they will be answered.”
In other words, defense beats offense.
Maybe. But the Bush people should glance at the Marine Corps
manual on warfighting. Prefer offense to defense, say the Marines,
“for only through the offense can we truly pursue a positive aim.” Despite
its difficulty, the offense provides the only way to achieve victory instead
of mere survival.
Offense and defense depend on each other, since attackers must defend
themselves, and defenders must strike at the opposition. As the great military
theorist Carl von Clausewitz said, defense “is not a simple shield but
a shield made up of well-directed blows. Democratic strategist James
Carville put it in an earthier way: “It's hard for someone to hit
you when you have your fist in his face.”
If the Bush campaign needs a reminder about the need to go on the offensive, they’ll soon get it when the Democrats convene in Los Angeles. The attacks on the GOP will probably be every bit as relentless as Bush suggested, and perhaps they will backfire. Then again, Bill Bradley can attest to the effectiveness of a Gore attack.
Of course, the happy talk at the GOP convention may well be part of a diversion. Quite possibly, the Bush strategists are lulling the Democrats into false confidence, all the while gathering their ammunition. In this scenario, the GOP “answers” to Democratic attacks will not just be a list of factual corrections, but a withering counter-offensive that takes the other side by surprise. That way, Republicans could still avoid blame for “going negative” by noting that they were careful not to fire the first shot. This tactic would be especially effective in serving Bush’s goals if the attacks came from surrogates while the candidate himself seemed to stay above the battle.
If the Bush people have such things in mind, then they have mastered the teachings of the ancient Chinese warrior Sun Tzu: “He who knows the art of the direct and the indirect approach will be victorious. Such is the art of maneuvering.” And such is the art of political warfare.
John J. Pitney, Jr. is
associate professor of government at Claremont McKenna College.