CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

            Even though the threats to the homeland are greater in number and volatility, a "fortress America" mindset would overlook the nation’s security links to many other countries and regions.[1]  In order for a homeland defense strategy to succeed, leaders in Washington must recognize two objectives: the survival of the United States and the prosperity of its citizens.[2] 

Counterterrorism has a fundamental constraint: increasing the security at one point tends to reduce the security of another, resulting in the displacement of the terrorist threat.[3]  So while a comprehensive homeland defense structure may succeed up to a point, it cannot eliminate the threat of terrorism and may alter its form into something even more unpredictable.  As the definition of the threat of terrorism changes, so too does its jurisdiction.  As Martha Crenshaw explains: “If the image of an issue can be changed, then its institutional venue may change accordingly.”  Issues can be partitioned among agencies, or different institutions can have more or less authority at various stages or sequences of a decision.[4]

Some have said that the United States should look to its foreign allies for models of counterterrorism reforms.  One example is France, which has a dedicated counterterrorism section within the Paris public prosecutor’s office.  This office has close working relationship with the national police and the French equivalent of the FBI and is made up of four dedicated prosecutors and four judges.  The prosecutors have special powers, including the authority to issue their own search warrants, order wiretaps and to hold suspects for questioning for extended periods of time without legal representation.[5]  What results is a proactive approach to terrorism.  The Vigipirate program complements the office’s work.  Created by the French government in response to terrorist attacks in 1995, the program allows the government quickly to step up security at transportation hubs, public areas, and threatened locations to deter terrorist threats.[6]  This is only a partial solution because it fails to address consequence management.  Unlike France, the United States is not a centralized parliamentary democracy.  Therefore, it is inappropriate to propose that the United States replicate the French model because American government structures will not provide for such aggressive police actions.

The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy

The Hart-Rudman Commission recognized that the government needed a comprehensive strategy to prevent and protect against attacks, and then to respond.[7]  Prevention and protection occur simultaneously.  At the same time that a suspect is arrested, law enforcement has both prevented an attack and protected the target from attack.  One could take the role of response and in the larger picture of homeland defense strategy, claim that prevention and protection are responses.  This last idea may be the most useful to understanding the need for a comprehensive strategy. 

The desire to spell out neat phases of operations is misguided.  By assuming that a terrorist attack will follow a rough timeline, government planners have failed to acknowledge that an event such as September 11th will result in an “officer-down” response from all capable and available agencies.  While incident control is necessary, the phase charts must reflect the simultaneous flow of resources, information, and confusion. 

The Hart-Rudman Commission, in arguing for the National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA), concluded that the “current distinction between crisis management and consequence management is neither sustainable nor wise.  The duplicative command arrangements that have been fostered by this division are prone to confusion and delays.”[8]  At the same time that every operations center is activated and information starts flowing, the investigative and rescue components begin to clash.  As Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating says, “We have seen too many cases in the past where an investigative agency or a rescue unit squabbled in private (and sometimes in public) over ‘my crime scene’ or ‘our rescue mission.’”[9]

Keating also says that it is an “almost instinctive urge common to officials of federal agencies and the military to open the federal umbrella over any and all functions or activities. Simply put, the federal government all too often acts like the 500 pound gorilla.”[10]  In order for any homeland security proposal to work, the government must work to reverse the cynicism that usually greets the phrase: “We’re from the government and we’re here to help.”[11]  Before finding a suitable weight-loss program for the federal government, one must understand why the government has set itself up for these organizational problems.  The major culprit is the vagueness of an achievable final goal.

Addressing the Bureaucracy

From the top down, there are two perspectives.  Academics prefer to focus on the participating organizations while politicians examine the leaders.[12]  Academics fail to note the limits of predicting success based on game plans and practice drills.  When there is an actual terrorist event, the structures, stated mission purposes, and available resources make up only half of a nation’s arsenal.  Team players know what they can do.  They also stress their limitations to justify their reluctance to take on larger missions that expose them to public scrutiny.  On the other hand, politicians spend so much time creating slogans that they often follow a harmful “can do” attitude.  By forgetting that the decisions of leaders are hindered by their beliefs and cultural or ideological identities, politicians refuse to allow organizations the option to pass up jobs or opportunities.  So politicians believe that organizations are resource hungry, while academics conclude that the organizations are power hungry.  Both views are only partially true.  Looking at homeland defense from these distorted perspectives only intensifies the debate.

It is appropriate for leaders at the top to hypothesize about ideal outcomes and unlimited cash.  At those moments when leaders experiment with live resources, they run the risk of further hindering their own efforts.  Federal policymakers, especially members of Congress, need to understand that existing practices are most effective when given support from above.  Rather than give organizations the resources to accomplish their missions, however, Congress prefers to scrutinize.  Unless entities such as the Border Patrol and the Customs Service can meet their increased workloads without someone analyzing their every move, Congress’s vague desire to accomplish the ethereal goal of homeland defense will fail before it even begins.  This does not discount Congress’s vital oversight role.  Rather, it is an example of the legislative branch’s ability to effectively paralyze the executive branch by independently calling leaders to provide the same testimony before numerous committees.  This further reinforces the need for Congress to coordinate their own activities.  The Bremer, Gilmore, and Hart-Rudman Commissions all advised Congress that its inability to coordinate efforts was just as detrimental to homeland security as the government’s lack of coordination.[13]  Congress must still oversee executive branch activities to ensure that money is appropriated to effective and successful initiatives.  Policymakers only exacerbate the homeland security situation by not agreeing on what constitutes homeland defense, where homeland defense begins, and who is responsible for each element.  

When an organization’s culture is widely shared and endorsed by operators and managers, it has a sense of mission.[14]  When an agency has vague goals, it is hard to convey to its members a simple understanding of what they should do.  Those on the ground define the tasks in ways that limit the administrator’s control, so the adopted definition is not the intended one.  Since agencies often have more than one goal and task, their competing internal cultures cannot easily mesh.[15]  Developing a sense of mission is easiest at the time when the agency is first created.  Agency leaders have fewer opportunities to affect culture, much less establish a coherent sense of mission, because most of Washington’s leadership occupies historical roles.[16] 

One element of the Office of Homeland Security operation that hinders an effective solution to the command and control problem is the vague goal of securing the homeland.  Vague goals only make circumstances more important.[17]  Those working to secure the United States react to and plan for situations on a daily basis.  What that means for homeland defense experts, advisors, and leaders is that manpower assets at the ground level cannot turn on a dime and respond to new draft ideas.  In an ever-changing security environment, the operators need an end-state to work towards.  Homeland defense has no end-state and therefore temporary fixes only confuse those individuals who need the clearest picture. 

Having a strong sense of mission is beneficial to an organization attempting to accomplish its goals – no matter how vague they might be.  Those at the ground level of homeland defense do not always need to be told what to do; they know what to do and they want to do it well.  Those at the top disagree with this idea.  Leaders think that they cannot afford to allow their personnel to exercise discretion when the outcome is in doubt or likely to be controversial.  This fear of failure reinforces the notion that deviating from the published role of an organization only results in public failure.  Agencies may reject jurisdiction and try to exclude issues from the agenda, especially if they think that they do not have a solution or that the new task is not appropriate to their mission or routine.[18] 

When President Bush created the Office of Homeland Security, he brought in individuals with preexisting ways of doing things.  With an ambiguous goal, their experiences influence how the office’s tasks are defined.[19]  To complicate issues, the office absorbed a liaison staff from representative agencies so that it might get a handle on its ability to define the government’s new 21st century role. 

When organizations try to redirect their moving freight trains with little warning any gains come at a price.  First, tasks that are not originally part of the agency culture will not attract the same energy and resources as tasks that are deeply rooted in the agencies’ persona.  Second, in agencies with competing cultures, defenders of one culture try to dominate.  Third, agencies resist taking on new tasks that appear incompatible with the dominant line of thinking.  The more that an agency’s culture follows its sense of mission, the greater the consequences if the freight train must change its path.[20] 

Homeland security agencies depend on political support, which is highest when the agency’s goals are popular, its tasks simple, its rivals nonexistent, and the constraints minimal.  While on paper this appears simple, in reality it is a naive hope.  As James Q. Wilson explains:

Ideally, a government bureau would like to be the only organization in town curing cancer and would like to have no limitations on how it goes about achieving that cure.  The typical bureau is in a much less happy state of affairs.  It must do something that is unpopular or difficult and that a half dozen other agencies are doing, and it must do these things under the watchful and critical eyes of countless subcommittees, interest groups, and journalists.  It faces inadequate budgets, complex tasks, several rivals, and many constraints.[21]

Bureaucratic struggles over autonomy come to the fore when agencies have similar tasks and are failing or having trouble.  Unfortunately, complete autonomy is impossible.  The best that a government official can hope to do is minimize the number of rivals and constraints and hope that Congress looks upon his agency in a favorable light.[22] 

In order for the Office of Homeland Security to establish its turf, it needs to find its niche.  In the absence of statutory codification, Wilson offers Ridge some rules of thumb.  First, seek tasks that no one else is doing.  This could be as simple as creating an interagency homeland-specific computer network or taking charge of interagency practice drills.  Second, fight anyone encroaching on your turf.  Third, avoid diverting the freight train and assuming tasks that are not part of the agency’s core culture.  Fourth, be wary of sudden friendships and joint or cooperative ventures.  Fifth, avoid angering your supporters by biting off more than the agency can handle.  Sixth, recognize that homeland defense does not allow for a risk averse culture.  When something goes horribly wrong (i.e. September 11th) at a high political cost the incident enters the agency’s memory as a legendary horror story.  The agency’s leaders must fill in holes as necessary and rally their troops to boost morale.  Following an unwritten policy of “once burned, forever shy” only reduces the agency’s capability.[23]

It is difficult to coordinate the work of different agencies and in order for them to cooperate they enter into “mutual nonaggression pacts.”  At the same time however, interagency agreements are perceived as threatening that same autonomy.[24]

The “Third Way”

The State Department Model

The solution to encroachment on traditional roles is to look to other organizational models.  While not as prominent as the 1999 Federal Response Plan, the State Department’s International Incident Response guidelines, carried out through the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, reflect a thoughtful methodology and delegation of authority.  The State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism holds Senate-confirmed ambassadorial rank (ambassador-at-large) and coordinates all U.S. efforts to improve counterterrorism cooperation with foreign governments.  The Coordinator consults with over twenty governments, actively participating in multilateral meetings.  He chairs the Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism and the State Department's terrorism task forces to coordinate responses to major international terrorist incidents.  Another primary responsibility is to develop American counterterrorism policy.[25]  One unseen aspect of his job is coordinating U.S. counterterrorism research and development efforts, including cooperation with selected countries.  Tom Ridge’s position, title, and responsibilities should be the domestic equivalent to the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

The Coordinator for Counterterrorism is the president’s representative with foreign officials.  He attends all meetings on international counterterrorism and assists the military in defining its counterterrorism roles overseas.  His domestic responsibilities reflect the roles of agencies, such as Health and Human Services or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in overseas terrorist incidents.  The Office of Homeland Security has a similar mandate to foster interaction.  If state governors (like foreign leaders) request assistance, the director of the Office of Homeland Security should be the only person they need to consult because he has the authority to answer questions and solve problems.  Unlike the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the director of the Office of Homeland Security is in the unique position to take advantage of developments and improvements that the states successfully use.  For example, it is easier for the director of the Office of Homeland Security to adapt a highly effective state response model to other states than it is for the State Department to adapt a foreign nation’s ideas to the unique way American government works. 

This opportunity for coordination only works if governors or other state officials consider the Office of Homeland Security effective and supported by both the administration and Capitol Hill.  Therefore, its director’s authority to redesign the federal response structure is only possible with statutory authority.  If the Office of Homeland Security is given the necessary power, one major aspect it needs to adjust is in the command and control elements of homeland defense.

Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) reinforced the State Department’s primacy in crisis and consequence management overseas, but broke up those functions for domestic attacks.[26]  The Office of Homeland Security must merge the two functions under one entity.  Crisis and consequence management activities occur at the same time.  Therefore, the lead agencies – the FBI and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) – demand priority access to a work-site.  One looks for evidence and seeks to preserve the crime scene while the other searches for bodies and digs through the rubble.  Each side interferes with the other’s operations and both argue that their role is more important than the other.  The State Department plan indicates that the decision to recover evidence or retrieve bodies rests with a single ambassador rather than with two agency heads.  By altering the domestic terminology and reeducating the public that crisis management includes responding to consequences, the Office of Homeland Security may assemble a sense of order to the federal response plans.  The office should place the entire command and control function under its authority so that it is the single entity reporting to the president and recommending or directing whether to proceed with response or recovery.  The first few hours of an incident are crucial for law enforcement and emergency response.

Personnel

If the Office of Homeland Security makes it clear that it is in control, federal responders can plan on interagency cooperation.  This does not mean that the office will take over FEMA’s preparedness programs.  It should play the lead role in the response and recovery phases and coordinate preparedness activities.  Federal responders also need to take into account their individual strengths and weaknesses as they affect their ability to prepare for terrorism.

Many individuals involved in domestic counterterrorism roles are specialists and entrenched in their job classification.  Responding to terrorism requires both general and specialized knowledge.  Generalists can evaluate the risks while specialists can identify custom solutions to problems.  This same line of common sense applies to homeland defense.  Specialists contribute their knowledge to problems requiring detailed answers.  They should not decide general policy matters unless they have some bearing on their roles and capabilities.  Generalists should not concern themselves with specific details.  In an emergency operations center, the incident commander (IC) cannot get bogged down in minutia because the IC must be aware of what the planning and logistics managers are dealing with.  But who is better on the ground?  The answer is both.  A give-and-take relationship between generalists and specialists allows for a smooth response and recovery. 

The Office of Homeland Security must educate its partners as to their roles and responsibilities.  The Office of Homeland Security should have a significant number of generalists with terrorism and emergency response experience to complement the resources under his authority.  Generalists can recommend substantive policies and the specialists can train to meet policy expectations.

The Emergency Support Team

The first Emergency Support Teams began in 1986 but remained secret until PDD-39 declassified certain details of their capabilities and responsibilities.  The existing Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) must resemble its foreign cousin in terms of dedicated assets and resources, personnel, and role.  The Coordinator leads an interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) comprised of generalists and specialists that stand ready to deploy overseas on four hours notice in the event of an international terrorist incident.  The FEST provides the Ambassador and country team with a twenty-four hour crisis management capability and determines the follow-on requirements in conjunction with the host country and the U.S. Country Team.  The FEST meets the requirements of the particular threat and members are drawn from various agencies.  Team members advise on such issues as crisis assessment, disabling, investigation, disposal, evacuation, and medical response.  While the FEST is advisory only, it assists in a wide range of specialized skills not usually available overseas.  The current DEST is buried in the FBI and its membership is limited to those agencies required to respond to the specific incident.  The result is the domestic team takes on an advisory and support role to the FBI on-scene commander.[27]  With the DEST under the FBI, the team comes across as the federal government’s insensitive 500 pound gorilla.  The Office of Homeland Security should take control of this crucial asset and assign it to the office or FEMA while at the same time stressing its support role to the state governor. 

The idea of a mobile command and control element gives a local community the initial responsibility for responding to a crisis.  Former New Jersey governor Christine Todd Whitman, reminded a Capitol Hill audience that state governors were the commanders in chief in their states:

As is true so often…it comes back to the governors to manage the fallout, literally or figuratively, of any kind of terrorist attack….  We are the ones along with our mayors and our local government officials, who actually must deal with people.  It is fine to deal with the theory, and we want to be part of that process, but ultimately, we are the ones who are responsible for dealing with the people.[28] 

The initial dependence on local capabilities and resources enables the federal government to assess the situation and arrange for proper resources.  One strength of the FEST is its “reach-back” capability from remote locations as the generalists and specialists determine what is needed and when.  By providing a menu of helpful solutions and resources to the state governor, the DEST reinforces its support role and insures that federal assistance goes to where it is needed.  If one compares the state governor to the leader of a foreign nation, the domestic emergency support team serves as the Office of Homeland Security’s version of the foreign team, and the governor/ambassador communicates the needs of the state/foreign nation to the United States government.

The Office of Homeland Security must meet the goals and objectives of homeland defense: to secure the United States’ ability to prosper.  To accomplish this the director of the Office of Homeland Security must be at once a diplomat, a teacher, and a dictator.  He serves as the president’s representative to local and state governments and in taking on a command and control capability, the director is accountable for his successes and failures.  Congress must be willing to regard homeland defense as a non-partisan issue requiring its unwavering and dedicated support.  Everyone needs to buy into the office’s plans.  Until then, the Office of Homeland Security is “basically playing high-stakes poker with a pair of twos.”[29]  While abuses of power and authority must be checked, homeland defense is not a petty political issue and should never be part of a blame-placing fight.

Homeland defense is not an issue to be afforded secondary status.  Rather, it should be a driving issue central to national security planning and that plan’s guiding principles are:  To protect, preserve and save lives and property; To hold accountable those responsible for terrorism; and To protect and advance America's interests and security.