

15 How to Believe in Qualia

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Why should we believe that qualia exist? It would not be surprising if, when confronted with this question, the qualia realist were puzzled. "Look around you," she might say, "and then pause for just a moment and reflect on your experiences. Isn't there a redness to your experience of that soda can on your desk? And isn't there a sweetness to your experience as you take a sip from it? Surely your experiences have qualitative aspects—surely there is something your experiences are like." And thus, to many a qualia realist, the answer to the question posed above is simple. Why believe in qualia? Because our every experience reveals their existence.

Unfortunately, the matter cannot be resolved this easily. (If it could, then there would be no need to produce a collection of papers making the case for qualia.) The existence of qualia has long been under attack. Opponents of qualia typically fall into two camps. In the first camp, we have philosophers who admit that, at least on the face of it, the phenomenological data support the existence of qualia. By their lights, however, there are strong theoretical reasons that count against qualia (typically that they cannot be accommodated within a physicalist framework). These opponents thus have the task of explaining why we should disregard the phenomenology of our experience. They must convince us why we should *not* believe in qualia.

In the second camp, however, are philosophers who deny the phenomenological data. Qualia realists have it wrong, they say. In fact, our experience does not reveal the existence of any qualia, for our experience is *transparent*—when we attend to our experiences, our attention goes right through to their objects. Such philosophers typically take these considerations of transparency to support a representationalist view of consciousness according to which the qualitative content of experience supervenes on, or even reduces to, the intentional content of experience. But for our purposes, what's important is that these philosophers deny that we have

any reasons to believe in qualia—or, at the very least, that if we do have any such reasons, they are not provided by our experience. These opponents of qualia thus shift the burden of argument to the qualia realist. It is the qualia realist's responsibility, they say, to convince us why we should believe in qualia.

This essay aims to do just that. As I will suggest, these philosophers in the second camp are mistaken—the phenomenological data do support the existence of qualia. I will not address those philosophers in the first camp, that is, I do not take up the question of how qualia can be accommodated in a physicalist, or even naturalist, account of the mind (though the argument may suggest that it needs to be). But by showing that experience does, after all, support the existence of qualia, I aim to show that qualia realism should be our default position.

1 The Transparency Thesis

The view that our experience is transparent is generally thought to trace back at least to G. E. Moore, who wrote, "When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous" (Moore 1903: 450). Although Moore subsequently qualifies this characterization of experience,¹ this remark has inspired many contemporary philosophers who present similar phenomenological descriptions. For example, consider the following passages from Michael Tye:

Focus your attention on a square that has been painted blue. Intuitively, you are directly aware of blueness and squareness as out there in the world away from you, as features of an external surface. Now shift your gaze inward and try to become aware of your experience itself, inside you, apart from its objects. Try to focus your attention on some intrinsic feature of the experience that distinguishes it from other experiences, something other than what it is an experience *of*. The task seems impossible: one's awareness seems always to slip through the experience to blueness and squareness, as instantiated together in an external object. In turning one's mind inward to attend to the experience, one seems to end up concentrating on what is outside again, on external features or properties. (Tye 1995: 30)²

If you are attending to how things *look* to you, as opposed to how they are independent of how they look, you are bringing to bear your faculty of introspection. But in so doing, you are not aware of any inner object or thing. The only objects of which you are aware are the external ones making up the scene before your eyes. Nor, to repeat, are you directly aware of any qualities of your experience. (Tye 2000: 46–47)

Likewise, consider Gilbert Harman's characterization of experience:

When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her experiences. And that is true of you too. There is nothing special about Eloise's visual experience. When you see a tree, you do not experience any features as intrinsic features of your experience. Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual experience. I predict you will find that the only features there to turn your attention to will be features of the presented tree. . . . (Harman 1990: 39)

These passages support what I'll call the *transparency thesis*, that is, the claim that experience is transparent. Some philosophers who endorse considerations of transparency intend only a very weak claim, namely, that is *difficult* to attend directly to our experience, or that *typically* we don't attend directly to our experience. But I take it that philosophers like Harman and Tye want to endorse a stronger version of the claim. On their view, it is not simply difficult but *impossible* to attend directly to our experience. The only way to attend to our experience is by attending to the objects represented by that experience.³ In what follows, I reserve the label "transparency thesis" for this strong claim.

As stated, even in this strong form, the transparency thesis is not itself a denial of the existence of qualia—or at least not straightforwardly so. In claiming that we cannot attend to qualia in attending to our experience, the transparency thesis remains silent on the question of whether qualia exist. But the transparency thesis nonetheless poses quite a threat to the qualia realist. First of all, we might plausibly suppose that any qualia worthy of the name must be introspectible, that is, introspectibility is essential to the nature of qualia.⁴ If this is right, then the fact that the transparency thesis denies that qualia are available to introspection ends up being tantamount to a denial of their existence. But even if we were to accept that there could exist non-introspectible qualia, the transparency thesis would still have anti-qualia ramifications. For even if the transparency thesis is strictly speaking compatible with the existence of qualia, if qualia cannot be introspectively attended to then it looks like we no longer have any reason to believe that they exist. Insofar as our belief in qualia is driven by phenomenological considerations, our being deprived of those considerations leaves the belief entirely unjustified.⁵

Generally speaking, the main proponents of the transparency thesis are representationalists. In fact, many representationalists use the transparency thesis as support for their theory, claiming that representationalism offers the best explanation of the phenomenon of transparency. Tye,

for example, claims that phenomenal content reduces to a special sort of intentional content.⁶ According to Tye, this helps us see “why visual phenomenal character is not a quality of an experience to which we have direct access (representational content is not a quality of the thing that has representational content)” (Tye 2000: 48–49).

In what follows, I will not take up the question of whether the transparency thesis can help motivate representationalism. Rather, I would like to focus instead on the prior question of whether the transparency thesis is true. To some extent, this will require us to look at the relationship between transparency and representationalism, since the defense of the first thesis often goes hand in hand with the defense of the second. But my primary focus here will be on transparency, not representationalism. To my mind, the pro-qualia case against transparency has not yet been satisfactorily made in the literature. Granted, qualia realists have produced numerous cases of apparent counterexamples to the transparency thesis—and I find many of these cases quite compelling. But, as you might expect, such examples are by no means uncontroversial. More important, however, is that most of the cases that have generated discussion are unusual in various respects—involving illusions, blurriness, or other non-ideal circumstances. Thus, the transparency theorist can often blunt the force of such examples. Even if he concedes that transparency fails in these “exotic” cases, he can still maintain that transparency holds for the vast majority of our experiences.⁷ And it is not very satisfying for the qualia realist to rest her belief in qualia on a few unusual cases.

This essay thus aims to advance the debate past a discussion of these exotic examples. Once we understand how the exotic cases get their purchase as counterexamples to the transparency thesis, we can use this understanding to think about the more mundane cases for which the transparency thesis is supposed to be obvious. Having seen that we attend to qualia in certain exotic cases, we are reminded how we attend to qualia in the mundane cases as well. In short, by seeing why the transparency thesis is false, we are reminded how, and why, to believe in qualia.

2 The Exotic

The first exotic case to consider comes from blurry vision.⁸ Suppose that someone who needs reading glasses peruses the morning newspaper while wearing his glasses. He sees the front page headlines clearly and sharply. When he takes off his glasses, however, his perception changes—he now has a blurry experience of those same headlines. Of course, this phenom-

enon is not limited to those who need reading glasses. Someone with perfect vision may achieve the same effect by unfocusing her eyes while reading the paper. When someone takes off his reading glasses, or unfocuses her eyes, there is a difference experientially—a phenomenal difference. How should this difference be best described? Does it seem that the words themselves are blurry, that is, that the blurriness is on the newspaper page itself? Or does it seem that the experience itself is blurry? Many people have the strong intuition that attending to the blurriness is different from attending to the words on the page. So insofar as the blurriness feels like an aspect of one's experience rather than an aspect of the headlines themselves, the case of blurry vision presents a problem for the transparency thesis.

A related case comes from phosphene experiences, that is, the color sensations created by pressure on the eyeball when one's eyelids are closed (Wright 1981; Block 1996). In offering this example, Block suggests that the phosphene experiences do not seem to be representing anything; we don't take the experience to suggest that there are colored moving expanses *out there* somewhere. Likewise in attending to the phosphene experiences, we don't seem to be attending to the object of the experience (some colored expanse *out there*) but rather to the experiences themselves.

A third kind of case comes from considering afterimages (see, e.g., Boghossian and Velleman 1989). In general, afterimages occur subsequent to the removal of some original (usually intense) stimulus. When a camera flash goes off, you might experience an afterimage in front of the photographer's face.⁹ If you stare intently at a bright light for a little while and then close your eyes, there will be a lingering glow in the darkness. And if you stare at a green dot for half a minute and then shift your attention to a bright white piece of paper, you will visually experience a red dot similar in size and location to the green dot you had been staring at. But in none of these cases does it seem as if the afterimage represents something that is really there. When you close your eyes after looking at the bright light, for example, you don't take the lingering glow to be on the inner surface of your eyelids. When you see the red afterimage against the white page, you don't take the redness to suggest the existence of a red dot on the page. As Block has suggested, afterimages "don't look as if they are really objects or as if they are really red. They look . . . illusory" (Block 1996: 32, ellipsis in original; see also Wright 1983: 57–58).

If the above descriptions of these cases are correct, they seem to pose a significant threat both to representationalism and to the transparency thesis. Each of these cases suggests that there can be phenomenal content

that does not reduce to representational content—either because there is no representational content (as in the afterimage and the phosphene cases), or because there is a difference in phenomenal content that does not correspond to representational content (as in the case of blurry vision). The cases thus pose a problem for the representationalists. And each of these cases also suggests that we can attend directly to our experiences without attending to the objects of our experiences—either because there is no object of our experience (again, as in the afterimage and the phosphene cases), or because the experience comes apart from the object that it represents (as in the case of blurry vision). They thus pose a problem for the transparency thesis.

Much of the ink spilled in response to these cases has focused specifically on defusing the threat to representationalism. Tye, for example, claims that in cases of blurry vision there is indeed a representational difference that can account for the phenomenal difference. Less information is presented when one takes off one's glasses: "In seeing blurrily, one undergoes sensory representations that fail to specify just where the boundaries and contours lie" (Tye 2000: 80). In the phosphene and afterimage cases, Tye thinks that by distinguishing what the experience represents *conceptually* from what it represents *nonconceptually*, we can dissipate the threat to representationalism (ibid.: 81–82).

These responses, however, do not do anything to dissipate the threat to the transparency thesis.¹⁰ As a general strategy, the representationalist responses suggest that the proponents of the exotic cases understate the representational richness of the experiences. There is more representational content there than we might have initially believed. But admitting this does nothing to change our original sense of the phenomenology of the experience. It still seems to us, when we are having a blurry experience, that we can focus on the blurriness itself, rather than on just what the blurriness is blurriness *of*. Our attention to an afterimage does not seem to be attention to some worldly content—we do not see "right through" the experience in this case. Even if we can be convinced that the blurry image, the phosphene experience, and the afterimage have representational content, that in itself does not convince us that they are transparent.

3 Between the Exotic and the Mundane

We see something similar by considering a set of cases that fall on the spectrum somewhere between the exotic cases considered in section 2 and the mundane cases for which the transparency thesis has the most

force. Recall that the transparency thesis derives its primary support from mundane visual experiences of, say, seeing a tree. But having begun with visual experience, proponents of transparency typically move on to perceptual experience generally, and then even to nonperceptual experiences as well. Tye, for example, explicitly claims that transparency holds across sensory modalities: "[T]he qualities of which we are directly aware via introspection . . . are not qualities of the experiences of hearing, smelling, and tasting. Rather, they are qualities of public surfaces, sounds, odors, tastes, and so forth" (Tye 2000: 50). He also claims that transparency applies to bodily sensations, such as pains or itches. For the moment, let's grant the move from mundane visual cases to mundane cases in other perceptual modalities. Insofar as transparency is plausible for the mundane visual cases, it will be plausible for the mundane auditory cases, and similarly for the other perceptual modalities. Nonetheless, as we will see in this section, the plausibility of the transparency thesis becomes considerably more strained once we leave the perceptual realm.

One example frequently invoked in this context is the orgasm. As Block has forcefully argued (in, e.g., Block 1996: 33–34), it is difficult to specify what the representational content of an orgasm could be. All attempts seem to fall far short of capturing this phenomenally "impressive" experience. Similarly, if we think about introspecting an orgasm experience, it is difficult to see what it would mean to say that our experience is transparent. In attending to our experience, our attention goes right through to . . . to where? In the mundane visual case, when I introspect my experience of a tree, my attention is supposed to go right through to the tree. But what would be the analogue of the tree in this case? The only possible suggestion would be some bodily location, but this doesn't seem faithful to the phenomenology of orgasms. And even if in attending to the orgasm we must attend to a particular bodily location, that doesn't seem to be all that we're doing.

A similar point can be made by thinking about pains. Does introspecting an experience of pain amount solely to attending to a particular bodily location? Here the transparency theorist must answer affirmatively. But this is a very hard position to defend. Moreover, it is not adequately defended simply by claiming, as Tye does, that whenever you become introspectively aware of a painful sensation, "your attention goes to *wherever you feel the pain*" (Tye 2000: 50). This claim is much weaker than the claim that your attention to the pain *consists* in your attention to the bodily location. Opponents of transparency can grant that when, for example, I have a pain in my toe, in order to focus on the pain I will have to focus

at least in part on my toe. But there is a difference between saying that introspecting an experience of pain *involves* or even *requires* attending to a particular bodily location and saying that *all that there is* to introspecting an experience of pain is attending to a particular bodily location. Even if the former, weaker claim is plausible, it's the latter, stronger claim that the transparency thesis requires.

It's worth noting, however, that the weaker claim too can be called into question. In at least some cases, it seems that we can introspect pain without attending to a particular bodily location where the pain is felt. With some kinds of throbbing headaches, for example, I can introspectively attend to the throbbing pain without my attention going through to a particular part of my head—or so it seems to me. Some headaches are confined to one side or another, other headaches do not even seem to be especially localized. Given that I lack any sense of “where” the headache is, it seems odd to claim that my attention is directed in any but the most general sense at a bodily location.¹¹

The same point applies to certain kinds of toothaches. I was once in need of a root canal in a tooth in the lower right side of my mouth, but I didn't know which particular tooth was the problem. I was in pain—in intense pain, in fact—and yet I could not myself pinpoint the precise location of the pain—even when I probed each tooth with my tongue or my finger. Eventually, the dentist pinpointed the problem spot for me by whacking the decaying tooth with a dental instrument. (I don't recommend having your dentist do this.) But his doing so changed my introspective experience. Only after he whacked the relevant tooth could I “find” the pain, and thus, only after he whacked the relevant tooth could I attend to the pain by attending to the tooth.¹²

The plausibility of the transparency thesis erodes further when considering emotions and moods. Emotional transparency is supposed to be relatively unproblematic, especially in comparison with the transparency of moods, since emotions at least tend to be associated with bodily occurrences. As Tye notes, “the qualities of which one is directly aware in introspecting felt emotions are frequently localized in particular parts of the body and experienced as such” (Tye 2000: 51). Anger might involve an increased pulse rate, fear might involve a tingling sensation along one's neck or a queasiness in one's stomach, and so on. This point enables Tye to treat emotional transparency analogously to the transparency of pain and other sensations. When we introspect pain, our attention is supposed to go to wherever we feel the pain. Likewise, when we introspect emotion, our attention is supposed to go wherever we feel the emotion: introspect-

ing anger involves attention to one's increased pulse rate, introspecting fear involves attention to one's queasy stomach, and so on.

Is this all it involves? For the transparency theorist, the answer must be "yes." When we introspect an emotional experience, our attention must go right through to some bodily quality or other.¹³ But this seems even less plausible for the case of emotions than it did for the case of pains. The typically tight connection between pains and bodily locations lends plausibility to the claim that we attend to bodily locations when we introspectively attend to pains. As I suggested above, however, the transparency theorist needs to defend a stronger claim—that attention to pain *wholly consists* in attending to bodily locations—to show that experience is transparent. Since there is a much looser connection between emotions and bodily locations, it is harder to establish even the weak claim that we always attend to bodily locations when we introspectively attend to emotions. Matters are even worse for the transparency theorist when it comes to moods, where there is virtually no connection to bodily location. But even if Tye is right that the weak claim is true for emotions or moods, that would not be enough to show that our experience of emotions or moods is transparent.

4 The Mundane

At this point, it will be useful to distinguish explicitly four claims about experience that have been playing a role in our discussion. These claims split into two pairs. We can set out the claims as follows, letting "E" stand for an experience:

1. E has representational content.
2. The qualitative character of E consists wholly in its representational content (i.e., representationalism is true).
3. Attending to E involves attending to its representational content.
4. Attending to E consists wholly in attending to its representational content (i.e., the transparency thesis is true).¹⁴

Just as we should not confuse (1) with (2), we should not confuse (3) with (4). Moreover, just as (1) does not imply (2), (3) does not imply (4). Claim (1) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for (2), just as (3) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for (4). Finally, whatever the relationship between (2) and (4)—a question I am here setting aside—it is clear that the truth of (1) implies neither (3) nor a fortiori (4). On the other hand, however, the falsity of (1) implies the falsity of both (3) and (4). If an expe-

rience lacks representational content, then our introspective attention to it cannot consist even in part of attention to representational content. So (1) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for all three of the subsequent claims.

Now let's think about how the transparency theorist attempts to accommodate apparent counterexamples to his thesis such as the exotic cases of section 2 and the nonperceptual cases of section 3. The exotic experiences like blurry vision and afterimages that we considered in section 2 threaten (4) primarily because they do not typically seem to have any representational content; for these experiences, that is, (1) seems false. But to defuse the threat of these cases, it is not enough for the transparency theorist to defend (1), that is, to find some representational content that they might have. Since (1) is not a sufficient condition for (4), defending (1) is only the first step. Even if these experiences do have some representational content, we need to be convinced that in attending to these experiences what we are doing—and *all* that we are doing—is attending to that representational content. And here the transparency theorist does not seem to have much to say.

For at least some of the nonperceptual experiences considered in section 3, the transparency theorist is on the same shaky ground that he is on with respect to the exotic cases. When it comes to orgasms and moods, it is hard to identify any representational content of the experience, that is, (1) seems false. But even for the nonperceptual experiences that plausibly do have representational content—experiences like pains and emotions—the transparency theorist is not on solid ground. The considerations he advances to help us see that we are attending to the representational content when we are attending to those experiences do not go far enough. They do not show us that *all* we are attending to when we are attending to the experiences is the representational content of the experience. In other words, even if (3) is true of these experiences, we need to be convinced of something more. And here again the transparency theorist does not seem to have much to say.

With these lessons learned from consideration of the apparent counterexamples to the transparency thesis, we are ready now to turn back to the mundane cases with which the transparency theorist begins—the very cases that are supposed to motivate the transparency thesis. What I want to suggest is that our discussion of the apparent counterexamples to the transparency thesis opens up some new logical space for the opponents of the thesis to make a case against it. Once we see why transparency fails in the exotic cases, we can raise parallel questions about the mundane cases.

Upon reflection, even the supposedly paradigmatic examples of transparency no longer seem as obviously transparent as they initially may have.

Look at a tree, we are instructed, and we are asked to try to turn our attention to intrinsic features of our visual experience. Proponents of transparency predict that we will fail. The only features there for us to turn our attention to are features of the presented tree (Harman 1990: 39). Our attention will always slip through to the greenness, and so on, as instantiated in the tree (see Tye 1995: 30). Keeping in mind our discussion above of the various counterexamples to transparency, however, I think this prediction is now called into question.

First, recall our discussion of the introspection of pain. Pain experience was alleged to be transparent because we cannot introspect it without attention to the bodily location where the pain is felt. However, as I discussed above, this fact alone does not establish the transparency of pain experience. The fact we attend to bodily location in introspectively attending to pain, even essentially so, does not mean that this is all we do. Likewise, the fact that we attend to worldly objects in introspectively attending to our perceptual experiences of worldly objects, even essentially so, does not mean that this is all we do. Compare a visual experience of a tree with a pain in your toe. The fact that you cannot help but attend to the tree when introspecting your visual experience of it no more establishes the transparency of visual experience than the fact that you cannot help but attend to your toe when introspecting the pain in your toe.

This conceptual point helps to create logical space for the failure of transparency, even with respect to perceptual experience. But of course, mere logical space is not enough. When we introspect our visual experiences, if we do not, or cannot, find anything else to attend to, then it looks like the transparency thesis will be correct for these experiences.

Here is where the moral gleaned from the exotic cases comes into play. Those cases showed us that transparency fails for at least some visual experiences. Insofar as those cases showed us how our introspective attention comes apart from the representational content of the experience, we can apply the lessons to the mundane cases. Consider again your visual experience of a tree. How can you attend to that experience without attending to the tree itself? To try to focus your attention away from the tree itself, think about afterimages, and about what you attend to when you are introspectively attending to your experience of afterimages. Now, once again, try to focus on that same aspect of your experience in your experience of the tree. You might try the following. Look at a tree, focus on your experience, and then close your eyes and image the tree. Focus in on the greenness on

your imaged experience. Now reopen your eyes, so that you're looking at the tree. I predict that you *will* find features there, other than features of the presented tree, on which to train your attention. In particular, you can continue to attend to the greenness that you were attending to while your eyes were closed.

If I am right about this, the problems for the transparency thesis extend beyond the exotic cases. Even mundane visual experience—the very kind of experience that was supposed to be a paradigm case of transparency—is not transparent. Interestingly, we are helped to understand what's going on in the introspection of mundane cases by better understanding what's going on in the introspection of the exotic cases. Our reflection on why the counterexamples are problematic for the transparency thesis—on what we attend to when we are attending to our exotic experiences—enables us also to see what we are attending to in mundane experience.

5 Conclusion

When we introspect our ordinary perceptual experiences, the world gets in the way. The presence of external objects—the representational content of our experience—threatens to crowd out the qualia. But that doesn't mean the qualia are not there. As I have suggested in this essay, we are reminded that the qualia are there in ordinary experience by thinking carefully about experiences that are more out of the ordinary. In these other cases, there is no external object crowding out the qualia, and we can thus more easily focus our attention directly on them. And having reminded ourselves what we do in these more exotic cases, we can gain a better understanding of what we do in the more mundane cases.

In particular, I contend that when we attend introspectively to our experience—whether exotic or mundane—we are attending at least in part to qualia. Our experience is not, in fact, transparent. And thus, based on the support of the phenomenological data, it seems that we have every reason—or at least, all the reason we initially thought we had—to believe in the existence of qualia.

Notes

1. The very next sentence (which, oddly, is often ignored) reads: "Yet it can be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for." See Kind 2003 for further discussion.

2. The quotation continues, "And this remains so, even if there really is no blue square in front of one—if, for example, one is subject to an illusion." As we will see in section 2, however, intuitions about transparency are much weaker with respect to illusions.
3. See Kind 2003, 2007, for further discussion of weak versus strong transparency.
4. See Kind 2001.
5. There might, however, be other (nonphenomenological) reasons to believe in qualia. See, e.g., Shoemaker 1994.
6. In particular, Tye thinks that the intentional content must be poised, abstract, and nonconceptual. This is what he calls his PANIC theory. See Tye 1995, 2000.
7. However, in Kind 2007, I deny that this sort of concessionary strategy saves representationalism.
8. See Block 1996; Boghossian and Velleman 1989; Wright 1975: 278.
9. It seems to me that this phenomenon was more dramatic in the "olden days" of actual flashbulbs. The flashes produced by today's digital cameras don't have quite the same effect.
10. For the purposes of this essay, I have set aside the question of the relationship between representationalism and the transparency thesis, but it's worth noting the following. If representationalism entails the transparency thesis, then showing that representationalism can accommodate the exotic cases would at least indirectly show that these cases do not pose a threat to the transparency thesis. But this alone would not help us to see where we went wrong in believing that we could attend directly to our experiences in the exotic cases.
11. Further support for this point might be derived from Ramachandran and Blakeslee's work on pain remapping (Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1999). In some amputees, touching one part of the body (such as the face) produces pain in the phantom limb.
12. For a different kind of example supporting this point, see Wright 1990: 3–14.
13. Strictly speaking, our attention need only go right through to some representational content or other, so if there were a plausible candidate for the representational content of emotions other than bodily states, the transparency theorist would not need to claim that attending to emotions involves attending to some bodily quality or other. Given the absence of a plausible alternative, however, the transparency theorist tends to interpret emotional experience along similar lines to pain experience, i.e., as representing states of the body.
14. Although (3) is weaker than (4), it does not correspond directly to what I have elsewhere called weak transparency (Kind 2003). Whereas strong transparency

claims that it is impossible to attend directly to our experience, weak transparency claims only that it is difficult (but not impossible) to do so. Nonetheless, if strong transparency turns out to be false, the truth of (3) might help to explain why weak transparency is true.

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